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Abstract
Isomorphism between formulae is defined with respect to categories for-
malizing equality of deductions in classical propositional logic and in the
multiplicative fragment of classical linear propositional logic caught by
proof nets. This equality is motivated by generality of deductions. Char-
acterizations are given for pairs of isomorphic formulae, which lead to
decision procedures for this isomorphism.
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1 Introduction
Isomorphism between formulae should be an equivalence relation stronger than
mutual implication. This is presumably the relation underlying the relation that
holds between propositions that have the same meaning just because of their
logical form. Any propositions that are instances, with the same substitution,
of isomorphic formulae would have the same meaning, which presumably need
not be the case for formulae that are just equivalent, i.e. which just imply each
other.
One may try to characterize isomorphic formulae by looking only into the in-
ner structure of formulae . This is the way envisaged by Carnap and Church (see
[4], Sections 14-15, where related work by Quine and C.I. Lewis is mentioned,
[5], [1], Section 2, and references therein).
Another way is to try to characterize isomorphism between formulae by
looking also at the outer structure in which formulae are to be found. This
outer structure may be a deductive structure, which is characterized in terms
of categories in categorial proof theory. The categories we need are syntactical:
their objects are formulae and their arrows are deductions.
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Isomorphism between formulae may then be understood exactly as isomor-
phism between objects is understood in category theory. The formulae A and
B are isomorphic when there is a deduction f , i.e. arrow, from A to B, and
another deduction g from B to A, such that f composed with g is equal to the
identity deduction from A to A, while g composed with f is equal to the identity
deduction from B to B. This analysis of isomorphism presupposes a notion of
equality between deductions, which is formalized in our syntactical categories.
(Equality between deductions stands here for what we and other authors have
called elsewhere identity of proofs ; see [8], [13], Sections 1.3-1.4, and references
therein.) Characterizing this notion of equality between deductions is the main
task of categorial proof theory, and of general proof theory.
That A and B are isomorphic means here intuitively that they function in
the same manner in deductions. In a deduction one can replace one by the other,
either as premise or as conclusion, so that nothing is lost, nor gained. The re-
placements, which are made by composing our deduction with the deductions
f and g, are such that they enable us to return to our original deduction by
further composing with g and f , since f composed with g and g composed with
f are identity deductions, and hence may be cancelled. (For a view concern-
ing isomorphic formulae like the one presented here, and its relationship with
propositional identity, see [6], Section 9, and [7], Section 5.)
The study of isomorphic formulae first started in intuitionistic logic, for
which it is widely believed that we have a solid nontrivial notion of equality of
deductions. This notion is characterized either in terms of the typed lambda
calculus (via the Curry-Howard correspondence), or in terms of categories based
on cartesian closed categories (these characterizations may be equivalent; see
[19]).
A result exists in this area for the implication-conjunction-⊤ fragment of
intuitionistic logic (see [21]). As far as we know, the latest advances concerning
the still open problem of characterizing formulae isomorphic in the whole of in-
tuitionistic propositional logic (which is related to Tarski’s high-school algebra
problem; see [3]) were made in [2] and [16]. There is a related result characteriz-
ing isomorphic formulae in the analogous multiplicative fragment of linear logic,
which corresponds to symmetric monoidal closed categories, and is common to
classical and intuitionistic linear logic (see [22] and [9]).
The problem of characterizing isomorphic formulae was not approached up
to now in classical propositional logic, and the results we are going to present
here cover this logic. They cover also a fragment of classical linear propositional
logic. To be able to approach our problem, and to obtain significant results,
we need for the logics we want to cover a plausible and nontrivial notion of
equality of arrows in categories formalizing equality of deductions in these log-
ics. A consensus for classical linear propositional logic may be found around
the multiplicative fragment of that logic caught by proof nets, which leads to
notions of category closely related to star-autonomous category (see [20], [14]
and references therein).
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For classical propositional logic, it is on the contrary widely believed that no
nontrivial notion of category would do the job. It is believed that no nontrivial
notion of Boolean category may be found. This is indeed the case if one wants
these Boolean categories to be cartesian closed (see [8], Section 5, [13], Section
14.3, and references therein). But, whereas on the level of theorems classical
logic is an extension of intuitionistic logic, it is not clear that this should be so
at the level of deductions and of their equality.
If one does not require that Boolean categories be cartesian closed cate-
gories, and bases equality of deductions in Boolean categories on coherence
results analogous to those available for classical linear propositional logic, a
nontrivial notion may arise. The coherence results in question are categorial
results analogous to the classical coherence result of Kelly and Mac Lane for
symmetric monoidal closed categories (see [17]). They reduce equality of arrows
in the syntactical category to equality of arrows in a graphical model category.
Such a nontrivial notion of Boolean category may be found in [13] (Chapter
14), and Section 4 of the present paper deals with isomorphism of formulae
engendered by that particular notion. Section 3 of the paper deals with isomor-
phism of formulae in classical and classical linear propositional logic different
from the notion of Section 4. That other notion, which involves graphical model
categories quite like those of Kelly and Mac Lane, is motivated by generality
of deductions (as suggested by [18]). The notion of Section 4 may also be un-
derstood as involving generality up to a point, but the notion of Section 3 does
so more consistently. Both notions are however analogous in that they base
equality of deductions on equality of arrows in some graphical model category.
The main results of the paper in Sections 3 and 4 are based on some pre-
liminary elementary results concerning classical propositional logic, which are
established in Section 2, and occasionally later in the paper. Although these
results are not difficult to reach, when they are combined with more advanced
results, such as those that may be found in [13], they give a complete characteri-
zation of isomorphic formulae in classical and classical linear propositional logic.
These characterizations are such that they easily lead to decision procedures for
the isomorphisms in question.
This paper is devoted to the problem of characterizing pairs of isomorphic
formulae. A related, but different, problem involving isomorphism is to charac-
terize arrows that are isomorphisms, in categories formalizing equality of deduc-
tions. (This problem for the conjunction-⊤ fragment of classical or intuitionistic
logic is dealt with in [10].) Although we have not dealt with that second prob-
lem explicitly in this paper, a solution for it may easily be inferred from our
results.
We will however not dwell on that, in order not to overburden the text with
categorial matters. In the whole paper we try to keep the presence of categories
to a minimum, and give more prominence to elementary, easily understandable,
logical facts. To appreciate the full import of our results the reader should
however be acquainted up to a point with certain notions covered in particular
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by [13] (and which we cannot possibly expose all here).
2 ∧∨ and ¬∧∨-equivalences
Let L be a propositional language generated out of an infinite set of propositional
letters, which we call simply letters, with the nullary connectives ⊤ and ⊥, the
unary connective ¬, and the binary connectives ∧ and ∨. We use p, q, r, . . . ,
sometimes with indices, for letters, and A,B,C, . . . , sometimes with indices, for
the formulae of L. Let L∧,∨, L¬,∧,∨ and L⊤,⊥,∧,∨ be the propositional languages
defined as L but with only the connectives in the subscripts.
We envisage also propositional languages extending L, in which we have
moreover the binary connectives of equivalence ↔ and implication →. We may
imagine that these two additional connectives are defined in L, and we shall not
introduce special names for these extended languages.
Let a ∧∨-equivalence be a formula A↔ B where A and B are formulae of
L∧,∨. Consider the formal system S∧,∨ whose axioms are the ∧∨-equivalences
of the following forms:
A↔ A,
((A ∧B) ∧ C)↔ (A ∧ (B ∧ C)), ((A ∨B) ∨C)↔ (A ∨ (B ∨ C)),
(A ∧B)↔ (B ∧ A), (A ∨B)↔ (B ∨ A),
and whose theorems are the ∧∨-equivalences obtained starting from these ax-
ioms with the following rules:
A↔ B
B ↔ A
A↔ B B ↔ C
A↔ C
A↔ B C ↔ D
(A ∧ C)↔ (B ∧D)
A↔ B C ↔ D
(A ∨ C)↔ (B ∨D)
A formula is diversified when every letter occurs in it not more than once.
A ∧∨-equivalence is diversified when A and B are diversified.
Assume that letA is the set of letters occurring in A, and let ApB be the result
of substituting the formula B for every occurrence of p in A. We can prove the
following lemmata.
Lemma 1. Assume that A is a diversified formula of L∧,∨, that B is a sub-
formula of A, and that letA− letB = {p1, . . . , pn} (where {p1, . . . , pn} is empty
if n = 0). Then there is a sequence S1, . . . , Sn, where Si ∈ {⊤,⊥}, such that
A
p1...pn
S1...Sn
↔ B is a tautology.
Proof. We proceed by induction on n. If n = 0, then B is A, and A ↔ B is
of course a tautology.
If n = k+1, and A is of the form C ∧D with B a subformula of C, then for
letC− letB = {q1, . . . , qm}, where {q1, . . . , qm} ∪ {r1, . . . , rl} = {p1, . . . , pn} for
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m ≥ 0 and l ≥ 1, we have by the induction hypothesis that for some S1, . . . , Sm
the formula Cq1...qmS1...Sm ↔ B is a tautology. Hence A
q1...qmr1...rl
S1...Sm⊤...⊤
↔ B is a tautology
too.
We proceed analogously when B is a subformula of D, or when A is of the
form C ∨D. In the latter case we substitute ⊥, . . . ,⊥ for r1, . . . , rl. ⊣
Lemma 2. If B is a diversified formula of L∧,∨ that has a letter q not in the
formula A of L, then A↔ B is not a tautology.
Proof. By Lemma 1, for some S1, . . . , Sn, where Si ∈ {⊤,⊥}, we have that
B
p1...pn
S1...Sn
↔ q is a tautology. On the other hand, Ap1...pnS1...Sn ↔ q cannot be a
tautology. So Ap1...pnS1...Sn ↔ B
p1...pn
S1...Sn
is not a tautology, and hence A↔ B is not a
tautology. ⊣
For A a diversified formula of L∧,∨ we say that the letters p and q are
conjunctively joined in A when A has a subformula P ∧Q or Q ∧ P such that p
is in P and q is in Q, and we say that p and q are directly conjunctively joined
in A when A has a subformula P ∧Q or Q ∧ P such that p is in P and q is in
Q, no subformula of P containing p is a disjunction, and no subformula of Q
containing q is a disjunction. We define analogously disjunctively and directly
disjunctively joined formulae (we just replace ∧ by ∨ and ∨ by ∧). We can
prove the following proposition.
Proposition 1. A diversified ∧∨-equivalence is a tautology iff it is a theorem
of S∧,∨.
Proof. It is clear that every theorem of S∧,∨ is a tautology. (This is established
by induction on the length of proof in S∧,∨.) For the converse, we suppose
that the diversified ∧∨-equivalence A↔ B is a tautology, and we proceed by
induction on the number n of connectives in A. By Lemma 2, this number must
also be the number of connectives in B.
If n = 0, then, by Lemma 2, the formulae A and B must both be a letter p,
and p ↔ p is an axiom of S∧,∨. If n = k+1, then A has a subformula either
of the form p ∧ q or of the form p ∨ q. Suppose p ∧ q is a subformula of A, and
consider how p and q are joined in B.
(1) It is impossible that p and q be disjunctively joined in B. Suppose
they are. By Lemma 1, for some S1, . . . , Sk, where Si ∈ {⊤,⊥}, we have that
Ar1...rkS1...Sk ↔ (p∧q) is a tautology. On the other hand, by using Lemma 2 we infer
that Br1...rkS1...Sk ↔ C can be a tautology only if either C ↔ (p ∨ q), or C ↔ p, or
C ↔ q, or C ↔ ⊤, or C ↔ ⊥, is a tautology. So Ar1...rkS1...Sk ↔ B
r1...rk
S1...Sk
is not a
tautology, which contradicts the assumption that A↔ B is a tautology.
(2) It is also impossible that p and q be conjunctively joined in B, but not
directly. Otherwise, we would have in B a subformula P ∧Q or Q ∧ P with p
in P and q in Q, and a subformula C ∨D of P with p either in C or in D; we
need not consider separately the analogous case when C ∨ D is a subformula
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of Q with q either in C or in D. Then Ap⊥ ↔ A
′ and Bp⊥ ↔ B
′ are tautologies
for A′ a formula of L without q and b′ a diversified formula of L∧,∨ with q. By
Lemma 2, A′ ↔ B′ is not a tautology, which contradicts the assumption that
A↔ B is a tautology.
So p and q are directly conjunctively joined in B. So in S∧,∨ we have as a
theorem B ↔ D for a diversified formula D of L∧,∨ with a subformula p ∧ q.
Since A↔ B is a tautology, it is clear that A↔ D is a tautology too. If Ap∧qq and
Dp∧qq are obtained from respectively A and D by replacing the single occurrence
of p∧q by q , then Ap∧qq ↔ D
p∧q
q is a tautology, because A
p
⊤ ↔ D
p
⊤ is a tautology.
In Ap∧qq we have k connectives, and so by the induction hypothesis we obtain
that Ap∧qq ↔ D
p∧q
q is a theorem of S∧,∨. Hence (A
p∧q
q )
q
p∧q ↔ (D
p∧q
q )
q
p∧q is a
theorem of S∧,∨; in other words, A↔ D is a theorem of S∧,∨, and since B ↔ D
is such a theorem too, we obtain that A↔ B is a theorem of S∧,∨. We proceed
analogously when p ∨ q is a subformula of A. ⊣
A ¬∧∨-equivalence is defined as a ∧∨-equivalence with L∧∨ replaced by
L¬,∧,∨, and, as before, a ¬∧∨-equivalence A↔ B is diversified when A and
B are diversified. The formal system S¬,∧,∨ is defined as S∧,∨ save that the
axioms and theorems are ¬∧∨-equivalences instead of ∧∨-equivalences, and we
have the additional axioms of the following forms:
¬¬A↔ A,
¬(A ∧B)↔ (¬A ∨ ¬B), ¬(A ∨B)↔ (¬A ∧ ¬B),
and the following additional rule:
A↔ B
¬A↔ ¬B
A formula of L is called ¬-reduced when ¬ occurs in it only before letters (i.e.
only in subformulae of the form ¬p). A letter occurs positively in a ¬-reduced
formula when it is not in the scope of ¬; otherwise it occurs negatively. We can
prove the following.
Proposition 1¬. A diversified ¬∧∨-equivalence is a tautology iff it is a theorem
of S¬,∧,∨.
Proof. It is clear that every theorem of S¬,∧,∨ is a tautology. For the converse,
we suppose that the diversified ¬∧∨-equivalence A↔ B is a tautology. It is easy
to see that in S¬,∧,∨ we have as theorems A↔ A
′ and B ↔ B′ for ¬-reduced
formulae A′ and B′ of L¬,∧,∨ (for that, the new axioms of S¬,∧,∨ are essential),
such that the diversified ¬∧∨-equivalence A′ ↔ B′ is a tautology.
It is impossible that a letter p occurs positively in A′ and negatively in B′.
Suppose it does. Very much as in the proof of Lemma 1, we would obtain for
some S1, . . . , Sn, where Si ∈ {⊤,⊥}, that (A
′)q1...qnS1...Sn ↔ p is a tautology. On
the other hand, (B′)q1...qnS1...Sn ↔ C can be a tautology only if either C ↔ ¬p, or
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C ↔ ⊤, or C ↔ ⊥, is a tautology. So (A′)q1...qnS1...Sn ↔ (B
′)q1...qnS1...Sn is not a tautology,
and hence A′ ↔ B′ is also not a tautology, contradicting what we have inferred
above from the assumption that A↔ B is a tautology. It is thereby impossible
too that a letter occurs negatively in A′ and positively in B′.
So the diversified ¬∧∨-equivalence A′ ↔ B′ is an instance of a diversified
∧∨-equivalence A′′ ↔ B′′, which is a tautology. (Just replace every letter p
occurring negatively in A′ and B′ by ¬p.) By Proposition 1, we have that
A′′ ↔ B′′ is a theorem of S∧,∨. Hence A
′ ↔ B′ is a theorem of S¬,∧,∨, and
since A↔ A′ and B ↔ B′ are theorems of S¬,∧,∨, we obtain that A↔ B is a
theorem of S¬,∧,∨. ⊣
It is easy to see that the formal systems S∧,∨ and S¬,∧,∨ are decidable
formal systems. (For every formula of L¬,∧,∨ we have a ¬-reduced normal form
in L¬,∧,∨ unique up to associativity and commutativity of ∧ and ∨.)
3 Isomorphic formulae with perfect generaliz-
ability
Let K be a category whose objects are the formulae of L¬,∧,∨, and whose arrows
f : A→ B are intuitively interpreted as deductions, or proofs, from A to B. We
assume that K has isomorphisms covering the theorems of S¬,∧,∨. This means,
for example, that we have an isomorphism of the type (A∧B)∧C → A∧(B∧C),
whose inverse is of the type A ∧ (B ∧ C)→ (A ∧B) ∧ C.
These isomorphisms of K correspond to deductions in the multiplicative
fragment of linear propositional logic. These are the basic arrows of K, but K
can have more arrows than that. We assume however that K does not go beyond
deductions of classical propositional logic, which means that if f : A→ B is an
arrow of K, then A → B is a tautology, with the arrow → interpreted as the
connective of material implication.
For a formula A, let |A| be the number of occurrences of letters in A. For
every arrow f : A → B of K, if x is an occurrence of a letter in A, then let
o(x) = n−1 iff x is the n-th occurrence of letter in A counting from the left,
and if x is an occurrence of a letter in B, then let o(x) = |A|+n−1 iff x is the
n-th occurrence of letter in B counting from the left.
We assume that every arrow f : A→ B of K induces on the ordinal |A|+ |B|
an equivalence relation Lf , called the linking relation of f , which satisfies the
condition that (o(x), o(y)) ∈ Lf only if x and y are occurrences in A or B of
the same letter. A linking relation is perfect when instead of only if in this
condition we have if and only if.
We say that A and B are uniform instances of A1 and B1 when they are
instances of A1 and B1 respectively with the same letter-for-letter substitution
(i.e. substitution that replaces a letter by a letter).
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We say that an arrow f : A → B is generalized to an arrow f1 : A1 → B1
when A and B are uniform instances of A1 and B1, and the linking relations
Lf and Lf1 are the same.
We say that a category K is perfectly generalizable when each of its arrows
can be generalized to an arrow of K with a perfect linking relation. Examples of
perfectly generalizable categories with syntactically defined arrows will be given
below after Lemma 3.
A category K will be called permutational when for every isomorphism f :
A→ B of K the linking relation Lf corresponds to a bijection between |A| and
|B|, and if g : B → A is the inverse of f , then Lg corresponds to the inverse
of this bijection. Permutational categories may be both perfectly generalizable
and not perfectly generalizable. In this section we consider those of the first
kind, while in the next one we deal with the second kind.
Permutational categories arise naturally whenever we have a certain mod-
elling of categories that we are now going to describe. The category SplPre is
the category whose arrows are split preorders between finite ordinals; Gen is a
subcategory of SplPre whose arrows are split equivalences between finite ordi-
nals, while Rel is a category whose arrows are relations between finite ordinals.
(The category Rel has an isomorphic image within SplPre by a map that pre-
serves composition, but not identity arrows.) A split preorder is a preordering
relation on the disjoint union of two sets conceived as source and target, and
analogously for split equivalences, which are equivalence relations. We have
investigated SplPre and Gen systematically in [15], [11] and [12], and we have
used Gen and Rel as model categories for equality of deductions in [13] and [14],
and in other papers related to these two books.
We may use these model categories to produce the linking relation of K in
the following manner. For a functor G from K into a model category such as
SplPre, Gen or Rel, we take that (n,m) ∈ Lf iff the ordinals corresponding to
n and m are linked by the reflexive, symmetric and transitive closure of Gf ,
which coincides with Gf if Gf is an equivalence relation of Gen. In this section
we are interested in particular in linking relations produced by Gen, while in
the next section we will encounter also one produced by Rel.
It may happen that the same category K produces different linking relations
with different functors G. The notions of perfectly generalizable and permuta-
tional category are relative to a chosen kind of linking relations.
Let us give an example of linking relations. We may have in K an arrow
f : p ∧ (¬p ∨ p)→ p corresponding to modus ponens, such that Lf will give the
following linking
 
 
p
p ∧ (¬p ∨ p)
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and another arrow g : p ∧ (¬p ∨ p) → p corresponding to the first projection,
such that Lf will give the following linking
❅
❅
p
p ∧ (¬p ∨ p)
The arrow f can be generalized to an arrow of the type p∧ (¬p∨ q)→ q, while
g can be generalized to an arrow of the type p ∧ (¬q ∨ r) → p. Both of these
arrows to which f and g are generalized have a perfect linking.
If the linking relations of the arrows of K are produced by a functor G into
SplPre (or a subcategory thereof), as explained above, then we may conclude
that K is permutational. This is because the isomorphisms of SplPre correspond
to bijections. This is so both for perfectly generalizable and for not perfectly
generalizable categories K. We can prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3. If K is a permutational perfectly generalizable category, and A and
B are isomorphic in K, then there are diversified formulae A1 and B1 such that
A and B are uniform instances of A1 and B1 and A1 ↔ B1 is a tautology.
Proof. Since K is perfectly generalizable, the arrows f : A→ B and its inverse
g : B → A of K are generalized to the arrows f1 : A1 → B1 and g2 : B2 → A2 with
perfect linking relations. Since K is permutational, these relations correspond
to bijections inverse to each other. From that we conclude that A1, B1, A2 and
B2 are diversified formulae. Since B is a letter-for-letter instance of both B1
and B2, which are diversified, B1 is a letter-for-letter instance of B2, and since
the linking relations of f1 and g2 correspond to bijections inverse to each other,
our letter-for-letter substitution produces A1 out of A2. According to what we
assumed at the beginning of the section, A1 → B1 and B2 → A2 are tautologies,
and hence B1 → A1 is a tautology too. ⊣
As categories K covered by this lemma we have the free distributive lat-
tice category of [13] (Section 11.1), which axiomatizes equality of deductions in
conjunctive-disjunctive classical logic (the objects of this category are in L∧,∨),
and the free proof-net category of [14] (Section 2.2), which axiomatizes equality
of deductions in the multiplicative fragment of linear logic without propositional
constants (its objects are in L¬,∧,∨). One may easily conceive other such ex-
amples, and in particular the example of a category axiomatizing equality of
deductions in the whole of classical propositional logic (whose objects are in
L¬,∧,∨). One would just take as equations of K those equations f = g such that
Gf = Gg, where G is a nontrivial functor from K to Gen making K perfectly
generalizable.
The following proposition characterizes pairs of isomorphic formulae for per-
mutational perfectly generalizable categories.
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Proposition 2¬. The formulae A and B are isomorphic in a permutational
perfectly generalizable category iff A↔ B is a theorem of S¬,∧,∨.
Proof. From left to right, suppose that A is isomorphic to B. So, by Lemma 3,
there are diversified formulae A1 and B1 such that A and B are uniform in-
stances of A1 and B1, and A1 ↔ B1 is a tautology. By Proposition 1¬, we
obtain that A1 ↔ B1 is a theorem of S¬,∧,∨, and hence A↔ B is that too.
For the other direction, we have assumed that the equivalences of S¬,∧,∨ are
covered by the isomorphisms of our category. ⊣
We have a Proposition 2 analogous to Proposition 2¬ with S¬,∧,∨ replaced by
S∧,∨, for categories whose objects are the formulae of L∧,∨. Since both S∧,∨
and S¬,∧,∨ are easily seen to be decidable systems, Propositions 2 and 2¬ lead
to a decision procedure for isomorphic formulae.
4 Isomorphic formulae without perfect general-
izability
For f : A → B an arrow, let the set of diagonal links of f be the set Df =
{(n, n) | n ∈ |A|+ |B|}. We will here call an arrow f : A → B in a category a
zero arrow when its linking relation Lf is equal to the set Df of its diagonal
links. A zero identity arrow is an arrow 0A : A→ A with L0A = D0A . The union
of the arrows f, g : A→ B will here be an arrow f ∪ g : A→ B such that Lf∪g
is the transitive closure of Lf ∪Lg. (For a general treatment of zero arrows and
union of arrows see [13].)
Consider a category K such that the objects of K are the formulae of L and
its arrows correspond to deductions in classical propositional logic. We assume
that in K we have for every A of L a zero identity arrow 0A, and we have also
closure under union of arrows. As a particular case of K we have the category B
of [13] (Section 14.2), but possibly also a category that besides the zero arrows
of the types ⊤ → ¬A ∨ A and A ∧ ¬A → ⊥, like those we have in B, has also
arrows of this type with linking relations given by the following pictures:
¬A ∨ A
⊤ A ∧ ¬A
⊥
The linking relation Lf of an arrow f : A→ B of B, which is an equivalence
relation, is not the relation Gf ⊆ A×B, where G is the functor into Rel with
respect to which B is coherent; i.e., the functor G such that for f, g : A → B
arrows of B we have that f = g iff Gf = Gg (see [13], Section 14.2). We
define Lf as the reflexive, symmetric and transitive closure of Gf . Note that
for f, g : A → B arrows of B we do not have that Lf = Lg only if f = g in B,
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but we still have that for particular arrows f and g, as in the proof of Lemma 7.
What we need essentially is that this holds when one of f and g is an identity
arrow.
For the categories K other than B we need the same assumption, which
is guaranteed of course if equality of arrows in K is defined via the linking
relations—if we have namely that for f, g : A → B the equation f = g holds
in K iff Lf = Lg. Our assumptions about K must guarantee also that we have
an analogue of Lemma 6 below. These assumptions can be quite standard, like
those spelled out in [13] and [14]. If composition of these linking relations is
defined naturally, like composition in the category Gen (see [15], Section 2, for a
detailed study), then in B we do not have that Lg ◦ f is equal to the composition
of Lf with Lg, but this may hold for other categories K.
We take that our assumptions imply that K is permutational in the sense of
the preceding section. However, K is not perfectly generalizable, because of the
presence of zero identity arrows. The arrow 0p : p→ p cannot be generalized to
one with a perfect linking relation. The category B is permutational and is not
perfectly generalizable.
The definition of the linking relation for the arrows of B given above, and
our notion of linking relation for K in general, is motivated by the wish to have
a uniform notion based, as in the preceding section, on an equivalence relation.
This uniform notion is related to generality of deductions (more consistently in
the preceding section than in the present one). If however we do not strive for
this uniformity, then we may define Lf for B just as Gf , and our proofs would
still go through. For K in general, we may also have a notion of linking relation
like Gf .
We prove first a simple preliminary lemma.
Lemma 4. For every formula A of L⊤,⊥,∧,∨ in which the letter p occurs there
are formulae A1 and A2 of L⊤,⊥,∧,∨ such that A↔ ((p∧A1)∨A2) is a tautology.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the number n of occurrences of binary
connectives in A. If n = 0, then A is p, and we take A1 and A2 to be respectively
⊤ and ⊥.
Suppose n > 0. If A is A′ ∧ A′′ with an occurrence of p in A′, then by
the induction hypothesis we have formulae A′
1
and A′
2
of L⊤,⊥,∧,∨ such that
A′ ↔ ((p ∧ A′
1
) ∨ A′
2
) is a tautology. We take A1 and A2 to be respectively
A′
1
∧ A′′ and A′
2
∧ A′′. If A is A′ ∨ A′′ with an occurrence of p in A′, then by
the induction hypothesis we have formulae A′
1
and A′
2
as before, and we take
A1 and A2 to be respectively A
′
1
and A′
2
∨ A′′. If A is A′′ ∧ A′ or A′′ ∨ A′ with
an occurrence of p in A′, then we have that A ↔ (A′ ∧ A′′) or A ↔ (A′ ∨ A′′)
is a tautology, and we proceed as before. ⊣
The tautology of this lemma is provable in every logic that algebraically corre-
sponds to distributive lattices with top and bottom. We have next the following
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lemmata.
Lemma 5. If B′ is obtained from a formula B of L⊤,⊥,∧,∨ by replacing a single
occurrence of q by p ∧ q, then (p ∧B)→ B′ is a tautology.
Proof. We proceed by induction on he number n of occurrences of binary
connectives in B. If n = 0, then B is q, and (p ∧ q)→ (p ∧ q) is a tautology.
Suppose n > 0. If B is B1∧B2 with the replaced occurrence of q in B1, then
by the induction hypothesis we have that (p ∧ B1) → B
′
1
is a tautology, and
hence, by relying on the associativity of ∧, we have that (p ∧ (B1 ∧B2))→ B
′,
where B′ is B′
1
∧ B2, is a tautology too. If B is B1 ∨ B2 with the replaced
occurrence of q in B1, by the induction hypothesis we have again that (p∧B1)→
B′
1
is a tautology, and since (p∧(B1∨B2))→ ((p∧B1)∨B2) (which corresponds
to a dissociativity arrow; see [13], Chapter 7) is a tautology, we have that
(p∧ (B1∨B2))→ B
′, where B′ is B′
1
∨B2, is a tautology too. If B is B2∧B1 or
B2∨B1 with the replaced occurrence of q in B1, then we have thatB → (B1∧B2)
or B → (B1 ∨B2) is a tautology, and we proceed as before. ⊣
Lemma 6. If A and B are formulae of L⊤,⊥,∧,∨, with x and y occurrences of
the letter p in respectively A and B, and A→ B is a tautology, then there is an
arrow f : A→ B of B such that in Lf −Df we find only the pairs (o(x), o(y))
and (o(y), o(x)).
Proof. By Lemma 4, we have formulae A1 and A2 of L⊤,⊥,∧,∨ such that
A ↔ ((p ∧ A1) ∨ A2) is a tautology. The proof of this lemma yields an arrow
τ : A→ (p ∧ A1) ∨ A2 such that (o(x), |A|) ∈ Lτ (note that if z is the leftmost
occurrence of p in (p ∧ A1) ∨ A2, i.e. the occurrence written down, then o(z) =
|A|). We also have arrows σ : (p ∧ A1) ∨ A2 → A and g : A→ B of B, because
their types correspond to tautologies. If ι1 : p ∧ A1 → (p ∧ A1) ∨ A2 and
ι2 : A2 → (p ∧ A1) ∨ A2 are injection arrows, then for
ζi =df 0B ◦ g ◦σ ◦ ιi,
where i ∈ {1, 2}, we have Lζi = Dζi , because the composition ends with 0B. If
pi : p ∧ A1 → p is a first projection arrow, then for 〈pi, ζ1〉 : p ∧ A1 → p ∧ B we
have
L〈pi,ζ1〉 −D〈pi,ζ1〉 = {(0, |A1|+1), (|A1|+1, 0)}
(this means that the two occurrences of p that are written down are linked).
If B′ is obtained from B by replacing the occurrence y of p in B by p ∧ p,
then the proof of Lemma 5 yields an arrow η : p ∧ B → B′ of B. Out of the
first projection arrow pi′ : p ∧ p → p we obtain an arrow θ : B′ → B such that
for θ ◦ η : p ∧ B → B we have (0, o(y)) ∈ Lθ ◦ η (i.e. the occurrence of p written
down in the source p ∧B and the occurrence y in the target B are linked).
For
µ =df [θ ◦ η ◦ 〈pi, ζ1〉, ζ2] : (p ∧ A1) ∨ A2 → B
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we have Lµ−Dµ = {(0, o(y)), (o(y), 0)}, and we take f : A→ B to be µ ◦ τ . We
have Lµ ◦ τ −Dµ ◦ τ = {(o(x), o(y)), (o(y), o(x))}. ⊣
The formulae A and B of L⊤,⊥,∧,∨ are letter-homogeneous when every letter
that occurs in A occurs in B the same number of times, and vice versa, every
letter that occurs in B occurs in A the same number of times. Two ¬-reduced
formulae of L are letter-homogeneous when they are uniform instances of two
letter-homogeneous formulae of L⊤,⊥,∧,∨. This means that such formulae share
both positive and negative occurrences of letters. We can prove the following.
Lemma 7. For A and B formulae of L⊤,⊥,∧,∨, if A↔ B is a tautology and A
and B are letter-homogeneous, then A and B are isomorphic in B.
Proof. Suppose A → B is a tautology and A and B are letter-homogeneous.
For every bijection mapping the occurrences of letters in A to the occurrences of
the same letters in B, there is an arrow f : A→ B of B such that Lf corresponds
to this bijection. This is guaranteed by Lemma 6 and the operation of union
of arrows of B. Since the same holds for the tautology B → A and the inverse
of our bijection, we conclude that there is an arrow g : B → A of B such that
Lg corresponds to this inverse. With the help of Boolean Coherence (see [13],
Section 14.2; this is the assertion that the functor G, on which the definition of
Lf is based, is a faithful functor from B to Rel), we infer from Lg ◦ f = L1A and
Lf ◦ g = L1B that f and g are isomorphisms, inverse to each other. ⊣
We can now prove the following.
Proposition 3. For A and B ¬-reduced formulae of L we have that A and
B are isomorphic in B iff A↔ B is a tautology and A and B are letter-
homogeneous.
Proof. The direction from left to right is an easy consequence of the fact that
the arrows of B correspond to implications that are tautologies, of the fact that
no arrow of B links a positive occurrence of a letter in the source with a negative
occurrence of a letter in the target, and vice versa, and of the fact that B is a
permutational category in the sense of Section 3.
For the other direction we use Lemma 7 and appeal to the fact that if the
right-hand side holds, then there are formulae A1 and B1 of L⊤,⊥,∧,∨ such that
A1 and B1 are letter-homogeneous, A and B are uniform instances of A1 and
B1 and A1 ↔ B1 is a tautology. We derive that A1 ↔ B1 is a tautology by
appropriate substitutions within A↔ B. ⊣
Every formula of L may effectively be reduced to a ¬-reduced formula iso-
morphic in B. So Proposition 3 gives a characterization of arbitrary pairs of iso-
morphic formulae of B, and leads to a decision procedure for checking whether
such an isomorphism exists.
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